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Participatory Defense:
Humanizing the Accused and
Ceding Control to the Client
by Cynthia Godsoe*
I. INTRODUCTION

This contribution to the Mercer University School of Law's 2017
Symposium on Disruptive Innovation in Criminal Defense discusses two
interrelated
defense
strategies:
humanizing the
accused and
contextualizing their actions in a society plagued with racism and
poverty, and ceding substantial control of the defense strategy and
legwork to the accused, and their family and friends. The first strategy
should not be, but is, disruptive; in a just (and sane?) criminal legal
system, this would be a regular part of the process. In our current vast
system of social control, however, focusing on the people in the system as
anything other than numbers or "bad actors" is often not the norm, even
by the attorneys defending them. The second strategy, empowering
defendants' families to assist or even challenge defense attorneys, is truly
radical. It shifts notions of expertise and questions deeply-embedded
power structures between attorneys and clients. As such, it has the
potential to not only shake up the public defense framework--one in
which, the clients, low-income by definition, have particularly little

Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Harvard Law School (J.D., cum
laude, 1998). Harvard University (A.B., magna cum laude with distinction, 1993). Member,
State Bar of New York and California. I appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions
of Bruce Green, Janet Moore, Jenny Roberts, Jocelyn Simonson, Ellen Yaroshefsky, and
the participants in the criminal law discussion at the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools in 2017. I am especially grateful to Raj Jayadev, one of the participatory defense
founders, who generously gave of his valuable time, sharing much insight into the
movement's goals and implementation. Thanks are also due for the excellent research
assistance of Sydne Schechter and Lauren Rayner Davis, and the thoughtful editing of
Hannah Couch, Lead Articles Editor, and her colleagues at the Mercer Law Review.
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power-but also to reinvigorate the attorney-client relationship more
broadly.'
To illustrate these disruptive strategies, this Article centers on the
participatory defense movement. The movement seeks to "transform the
landscape of power in the court system" by training the families and
friends of the accused in how the criminal system works and how to help
with their defense. 2 Rather than merely relying on defense attorneys or
other professional advocates, participatory defense sharply highlights
the defendant as a person embedded in a community and focuses on
empowering that community to successfully impact both individual cases
and the broader court system. 3 As the movement's founder, Raj Jayadev,
describes it, his community organization knew how to protest against
over-criminalization and police misconduct but "[was] relinquishing
power, arguably, at the most critical moment, which is when a case hit
the courts ... . Our thought was, 'We're not lawyers. That is not our arena
to make change."' 4 They decided to alter this perception and remedy this
structural exclusion by recognizing the accused and their communities
as sources of knowledge, defense strategies, and the potential to
transform the criminal law system. As "change agents," defendants and
their families would cease being the objects of a case and would become
autonomous actors and subjects. The movement has met with great
success in individual cases and is also leading to some larger reforms. 5
Despite this success, the movement was not initially welcomed with
open arms by all public defenders.6 Indeed, the movement organizers
1. The vast majority-over 80%-of criminal defendants are poor and qualify for
public defenders. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000).
2. Raj Jayadev, What is "ParticipatoryDefense," ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT, https://acjusticeproject.org/about/purpose-and-practice (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
3. This is not to say that many defenders have not been using some of these
approaches or strategies; this is particularly so for offices engaging in holistic defense,
representing juveniles who are, by definition, embedded in a family and community, and
those engaging in both individual defense and systemic advocacy. A few examples include
the New York City Legal Aid Society Juvenile Defense Practice, Bronx Defenders, and the
Georgia Justice Project.
Defense,'CRIME
4. Katti Gray, Friends in Court: The GrowingImpact of 'Participatory
REP. (2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/03/29/friends-in-court-the-growing-impact-ofparticipatory-defense.
5. See infra notes 16, 19-22, & 25-26 (discussing impact in individual cases, as well
as larger reforms such as increasing inclusion of the community in court proceedings, and
recognizing the structural factors, such as poverty and racism, often underlying crime).
6. As I explain more fully below, my analysis here is overly simplistic, as there is
inevitably a range of reactions even among defenders in the same office. See infra note 7.
Nonetheless, I believe that there are some commonalities to innovations and institutional
change about which we can draw some tentative insights. Here, I draw on my own
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experienced "pushback in every scenario." 7 Some defenders feared
additional tasks added to an already large workload, or confidentiality or
privilege violations. Others raised the risks to effective individual
defense in expanding client agency, and, particularly, to loosening the
concept of a client to recognize that a defendant comes to her case in a
particular context with family, friends, and community members.8 These
risks to confidentiality and case outcomes are real, as I elaborate further
below, but they exist in every case, not just in participatory defense cases.
I suspect that the resistance has, at least in part, had to do with the
movement's central tenet of shifting expertise and case direction away
from the lawyers and other professionals, something I say as a former
defender myself.9 As I outline further below, the structure of the criminal
system, coupled with the disproportionate poverty and political
powerlessness of most defendants, makes public defenders less
accountable to their clients than most attorneys. Indeed, defendants
must rely primarily on their attorneys' own zeal and internalized desire
to practice ethically, rather than any external controls such as bar
discipline or judicial action.10 For although they seek to defend the
accused, and usually, to reform the criminal law system, defenders are
still part of the power structures that exclude non-lawyers and
non-professionals from the court systems and silence the people most
affected."
Changing an institution is difficult, and those seeking to alter public
defense practice face the intertwined challenges of bureaucratic
experience, conversations with many other defenders from numerous offices, and writings
on the criminal law system and public defense, to sketch a picture of a common defender
practice, recognizing "the contextual differences and informal norms that influence lawyers'
decision making" in the defense context. Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather, Why Context
Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 3, 5-6 (2012).
7. Telephone Interview with Raj Jayadev, CEO, Silicon Valley De-Bug's Albert
Cobarrubias Justice Project (Dec. 5, 2017). I also draw from my own experience and
conversations with several current and former defenders to anticipate some of these
reactions and concerns.
8. Participatory defense members hear these same two concerns over and over as they
expand to new locations.
9. This Article reflects my own views informed by prior practice experience and by
teaching and writing about attorney ethics. They are not necessarily Jayadev's views.
10. See infra notes 35-39.
11. See Liana Pennington, An Empirical Study of One ParticipatoryDefense Program
Facilitated by a Public Defender Office, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 604 (2017); Jocelyn
Simonson, Democratizing CriminalJustice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 Nw.
UNIV. L. REv. 1609 (2017). With participatory defense, Jayadev describes how the criminal
law system, and courts in particular, have been particularly siloed from community
scrutiny and collective action compared to other public systems. Jayadev Interview, supra
note 7.
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resistance to change and the common, if often unconscious, desire of
lawyers to hold onto their privilege over lay people, including their
clients. 12 The focus on client agency in participatory defense means that
tension between mainstream practice and newly empowered clients is
not just likely, but actually inevitable-baked into the model itself. The
movement organizers have been tremendously successful at overcoming
these concerns, demonstrating that participatory defense can actually
reduce risks and increase attorney resources. Tellingly, and to the
surprise of the founders, public defender offices, initially wary, are now
reaching out to them and embracing what participatory defense can
offer. 13 Yet, the movement offers more than resources and better
outcomes; instead its vision of zealous advocacy and client autonomy
represents an overdue shift in power back to the client and reveals the
tension between practice or ethical risks and participatory defense to be
overstated. 14
This Article unfolds in four parts. In Part II, I describe the
participatory defense model and its focus on humanizing the accused,
recognizing "lay expertise," and shifting control. Part III examines
potential reactions by defenders to the movement, including both concern
over risks to clients and case outcomes, and resistance to change on both
an institutional and individual level. In particular, the goal of the
movement-to empower clients to assist, direct, and even challenge their
appointed counsel-shakes up the typical rubric of "lawyer as expert"
driving the representation. In Part IV, I argue that, despite these risks
and practice challenges, defenders should incorporate participatory
12. Numerous scholars have pointed out the tension between lawyers' privilege over
their clients and client agency. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical
Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 634
(1986) ("Because of the large advantages over the client built into the lawyer's professional
role, and because of the disadvantages and vulnerabilities built into the client's role, the
professional must subordinate his interest to the client's."). Most notably, Gerald Lopez
critiqued the traditional "regnant" lawyering model as elitist and paternalistic,
undergirded by hierarchies and assumptions that devalued clients and non-mainstream
views and approaches. See GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION

OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). His seminal critique was particularly directed at
public interest lawyers, given their clients were by definition low-income and often
marginalized racially and in other ways. I discuss Lopez's work further at infra notes 5657.
13. Jayadev Interview, supranote 7.
14. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.2, are somewhat
ambiguous about how to implement client direction, particularly as to means and
strategies. See infra note 36. Indeed, a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United
States in January 2018 highlights the ambiguities in this area. See McCoy v. Louisiana,
138 S. Ct. 53 (2017) (considering criminal defense attorney obligation to follow client
direction). See infra note 89, at 37.
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defense tenets into their practice. Indeed, they must because the model
is consistent with, even required by, the ethical rules governing lawyers.
I conclude that participatory defense has the potential not only to
transform the criminal law system, but also to change the defender
practice model, and return us to the zealous advocacy and client
autonomy at the heart of lawyering. 15
II. THE PARTICIPATORY DEFENSE MODEL

Founded within the last decade, participatory defense is a grass-roots
movement to empower families and communities in their loved ones'
criminal defense and organize both for individual case outcomes and
systemic change.16 The movement's founder, Raj Jayadev, with
co-authors Janet Moore and Marla Sandys, describes the goal of the
movement as follows:
Participatory defense amplifies the voices of the key stakeholderspeople who face criminal charges, their families, and their
communities-in the struggle for system reform. [It] empowers these
key stakeholders to transform themselves from recipients of services
provided by lawyers and other professionals into change agents who
force greater transparency, accountability, and fairness from criminal
justice systems.17
To this end, the movement trains families and community members in
gathering evidence; dealing with police, judges, and other court players;

15. The constitutional dimensions of the right to counsel in criminal cases, although
beyond the scope of this analysis, render these concerns even more pressing. See, e.g., Brief
for A.B.A., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 53
(2017) (No. 16-8255) (connecting attorney ethical obligations to respect client autonomy to
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and quoting high court case law that the
Constitution "'grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense,' because it is
the defendant 'who suffers the consequences if the defense fails"'). See also Brief for Ten
Law School Professors and the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S Ct. 53 (2017) (noting in case construing
criminal defense attorney obligation to follow client direction that "[w]hile not every
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct has a constitutional dimension, the ethical
failures in this case do. [The attorney] usurped Mr. McCof's constitutionally guaranteed
right to define the objectives of the representation.").
16. Jocelyn Simonson has situated participatory defense within a larger framework of
grass-roots collective resistance to the carceral state. See Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing
CriminalJustice Through Contestationand Resistance, 111 Nw. UNIv. L. REV. 1609 (2017)
(describing other examples such as court-watching, cop-watching, and community bail
funds).
17. Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory
Defense and the Struggle for CriminalJustice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2014).
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making social biography videos; and other skills to best help their loved
ones being charged. They also assist them to "work strategically" with
overworked and under-resourced defense attorneys to ensure zealous
advocacy in their family members' cases.' 8 Finally, participatory defense
also encourages people to connect individual cases to larger systemic
problems in the criminal law system, including racial bias and
over-incarceration. The movement has spread to a number of locations
throughout the country and has had considerable success in reducing
sentences, lowering charges, and raising awareness of overcriminalization. 19 Despite this, as discussed further below, public
defenders have not always been as welcoming as one might expect.
A. Humanizing and Contextualizing the Accused
A central tenet of participatory defense is humanizing defendants and
contextualizing their actions. As I noted earlier, this strategy should not
be disruptive-juries and judges should consider those before them as
individual people embedded in a community, who come to the criminal
system with unique histories and potential for rehabilitation. 20
Unfortunately, our current system often does not allow for this, but
instead, operates as an assembly line. 21 Humanizing individual accused
people enables decision-makers and players in the system to understand
the defendants and account for past trauma or other experiences that can

18. David Bornstein, Guiding Families to a FairDay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2015), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/guiding-poor-families-to-a-fair-da
y-in-court.
19. Albert Cobarrubias Project estimates 1,862 saved years of prison time by 2015 in
the one location. See Jayadev, supra note 2; Jamilah King, This Defense in Court Has Saved
People 1,862 Years in Prison, MIC (Dec. 21, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/130479/thisdefense-in-court-has-saved-people-1-862-years-in-prison#.njMmPgZ3y ("[T]he method has
been used for nearly nine years in Santa Clara County, and its fiercest supporters say that
it's saved people more than 1,862 years in prisons and jails.").
20. This strategy has some doctrinal roots, at least for juveniles. The recent Supreme
Court decisions in a trilogy of cases requires individualized consideration of a juvenile's
culpability and potential rehabilitation, as well as the context of his family and
environment, in certain sentencing contexts. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Scholars have persuasively argued that these cases have a broader import, that their
"language, logic, and science" make possible "truly revolutionary changes in juvenile justice
policy and practice." See Cara H. Drinan, Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 178990 (2016).
21.

See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012); Issa

Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611
(2014); Jenny Roberts, Crashingthe Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089
(2013).
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help to explain their actions and shed light on culpability and appropriate
punishment. 22
Participatory defense trains family members and others to make
"social biography" videos, depicting the daily life and community of
accused people through workshops on topics such as "Effective Strategies
for Telling Client's Story through Video." These videos force prosecutors,
judges, and other decision-makers to look at defendants as individual
people and not just numbers in a vast system. The videos also reveal
those in the system to be multidimensional and more than just "bad acts."
As one trial judge put it, these videos "humanize defendants, destroy
[often racial] stereotypes, and leave [us] with a far better understanding
of the persons standing before [us]."23
The videos have been very effective in individual cases. One defender
noted that the court explicitly referenced the video in his client's
sentencing:
The client faced a guideline range of 91 to 120 months; the government
recommended a guideline sentence, probation recommend four years
and the Court imposed a sentence of six months incarceration that
included 90 days of home detention. I have no doubt that the
24
video ... played a determinative role in that outcome.
Another noted the video helped convince the prosecutor to agree to a
lesser charge because "[the defendant] was no longer an anonymous
person whose fate he was deciding. The video humanized her, and her
family and I think [the prosecutor] couldn't help but be affected by it."25
These strategies also have an impact beyond any individual case.
Humanizing the accused and their families highlights the real harm done
to these people by harsh policies, such as mandatory minimum
sentences. 26 Further, offering a life history that demonstrates the impact

22. One caveat: As I describe further below, sometimes the defendants' history of
trauma can be used against them and result in more restrictive sentencing or monitoring.
See infra notes 27, 46, & 47.
23. Moore et al., supra note 17, at 1286 (quoting Social Biography Videos, ALBERT
COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT (June 4, 2014), http://acjusticeproject.org/social-biographyvidoes/).
24. We Beat a 10 Year Sentence in New York with a Social Biography Video!, ALBERT
7
COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT (Jan. 27, 2015), https://acjusticeproject.org/2015/01/0 /webeat-a- 10-year-sentence-in-new-york-by-sharing-a-family-story-through-video.
25. Atlanta Public Defender Cuts a 25 Year Sentence to 3 With Use of Our Social
Biography Video Process!, ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT (Nov. 9, 2014),
https://acjusticeproject.org/2014/11/09/atlanta-public-defender-cuts-a-25-year-sentence-to3-with-use-of-our-social-biography-video-process.
26. Thanks are due to Jenny Roberts for this insight.
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of mental illness, poverty, and foster care on people in the system
emphasizes societal problems that begin in childhood and "demand[s]
system responses that help heal the roots of their crimes [like trauma
and poverty]... [and] chip away... at our system of mass incarceration."2 7
B. Recognizing "Lay" Expertise and Shifting Control
Other key, and more radical, tenets of participatory defense are
expanding the notion of expertise to include laypeople, such as
community members, and empowering accused people to truly exercise
their autonomy and direct their cases. The community meetings and
trainings often exclude attorneys, instead relying on peers and family
members who have gone through the system themselves to train
newcomers. As one proponent describes, "There are no lawyers in the
room, but in many respects, that is the point. From a movement-building
sensibility, the case outcome is not the only measuring stick, but also
important is whether the process transformed someone's sense of power
and agency." 28 Otherwise, old habits would continue with attorneys
taking the lead as the "experts," and clients and their families relying on
the attorneys rather than recognizing their collective "community
intelligence" and taking matters into their own hands. 29
In a fascinating extension of this redefinition of expertise, the
movement has proffered community members as gang experts to counter
police or other professional experts' testimony for the prosecution. For
instance, in one case, "Julio" was charged with a potential life sentence
crime for gang activity. Julio's family members did the following to
advocate for his innocence and counter the standard narrative of gang
activity in communities of color:
Dissected and countered the gang packet that
labeled Julio as a gang member
Consistently met with attorney
Offered community leaders who knew Julio and
the community to counter the 'gang expert' produced
by the District Attorney
Assisted the attorney in creating a presentation
to the District Attorney.s0
27. Protect Your People: A Public Defender's Reflection on ParticipatoryDefense,
ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT (May 23, 2017), https://acjusticeproject.org/2017/05/
23

/protect-your-people-a-public-defenders-reflection-on-participatory-defense.
28. See Jayadev, supra note 2.
29. See Jayadev Interview, supranote 7.
30. See Jayadev, supra note 2.
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As a result, the prosecutor dropped the charges, something that would
likely not have been possible without the involvement of Julio's
community via participatory defense.
Even more disruptive to current norms in the criminal law system is
the movement's goal of shifting control within the attorney-client
relationship to the client. Inspired both by the resource scarcity plaguing
public defenders and by a model of grass-roots empowerment,
participatory defense has always envisioned defenders as clients' allies,
while aiming to transform the relationship to one of equals, rather than
31
the attorney as giver and the client as passive recipient. To this end,
the movement aims to enable clients to direct their cases and participate
in advocacy, making the families and community around the accused "an
32
essential and effective part of the defense team." They do so by serving
as "lay-experts," as described above, performing investigations, and
strategizing with the attorney and the accused about witnesses and
defenses. In short, participatory defense is "not about the person
receiving a better service, it [is] about becoming the agent of change
33
themselves."
Client autonomy is inherently connected to attorney performance.
Rather than being passive recipients of public defenders' services,
defendants and their families are advised to sometimes "push [their
34
defense attorneys] if needed." Defenders with their high caseloads and
triage mindset may not return phone calls promptly or take the time to
explain the process other than telling their clients to show up in court.
The movement's organizers encourage people to demand more frequent
and better communication, giving them specific tactics like copying an
office supervisor on an email, that these marginalized communities may
not have known were available to them. In this manner, the low-income
clients churned through the criminal system are put on a more equal
31. Indeed, the attorney-client relationship is really something different than a
partnership, as the clients in a criminal case are the holders of right to counsel, with the
attorneys serving to implement that but having no standing on their own.
32. Pennington, supra note 11, at 604.
33. Raj Jayadev, The Story of ParticipatoryDefense, SILICON VALLEY DE-BUG (May 22,
2015), http://archives.siliconvalleydebug.org/articles/2015/05/22/story-participatory-defen
se. Part of this is receiving better information and advocacy from defenders. See, e.g., Maura
THE
Ewing, How Prisoners'Family Members Can Assist Overworked Public Defenders,
7
ATLANTIC (July 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/0 /a-replaceme
nt-for-overworked-public-defenders/532476 (reporting one case where a mother involved in
participatory defense was not receiving return phone calls from her son's defender and went
to a supervisor to advocate for better communication). Founder Jayadev has noted both the
lack of resources and the "indifferen[ce]" of some defenders. See Gray, supra note 4.
34. See Jayadev, supra note 2.
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playing field with paying clients, who can vote with their wallets. As
Moore, Sandys, and Jayadev theorize, "[t]hrough this productive tension
[between attorneys and empowered clients and families], participatory
defense presses to improve standards of attorney performance."3 5
This community monitoring of public defenders' practice is essential
because numerous structural factors render them less accountable to
their clients than most attorneys. Their clients are non-paying. Who pays
the bills is not supposed to influence attorney practice, 36 but in reality,
it sometimes does. Public defense clients are often incarcerated and have
little access to phone or email to ask questions or issue directives. Those
involved in the criminal legal system are also disproportionately less
educated and have little access to political and other avenues of power.
Many are juveniles, whose attorneys sometimes explicitly disregard their
stated interests, or very young adults who are similar to juveniles in their
unfamiliarity with the system and potential inability to easily assist in
their own defense. 37 Overwhelming caseloads and scarce resources
compound the barriers to effective attorney-client communication, which
is essential to quality representation.3 8

35. Moore et al., supra note 17, at 1300.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 11 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983) ("Because
third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including
interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the
representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such
representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the
lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the
client.").
37. I have previously critiqued this Guardian Ad Litem representation model for
representing juveniles as paternalistic and harmful. See Cynthia Godsoe, All in the Family:
Towards a New RepresentationalModel for Parentsand Children, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
303 (2011). As to the latter concern, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged it in
Graham v. Florida. 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010) ("[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from
adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles
mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the
roles of the institutional actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively
with their lawyers to aid in their defense.").
38. Moore et al., supra note 17, at 1296-97 ("For attorneys who strive to provide not
merely constitutionally effective but high quality defense services, onerous workloads and
fee caps create agonizing choices."). Scholars have described the complicated role and
challenges to effective communication that public defenders face, which result in "grim
expectations and experiences of [the] representation on the part of defendants and
defenders alike." Janet Moore, Ellen Yaroshefsky & Andrew L.B. Davies, PrivilegingPublic
Defense Research, 69 MERCER L. REV. 769 (2018).
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Effective assistance of counsel sets a very low bar, as do malpractice
doctrines in most states. 39 There is little public will to change the quality
of defense, or increase resources, based in part on the widespread feeling
that people accused of crimes are largely deserving of punishment.
Practically speaking, the main thing that indigent criminal defense
40
clients, who comprise an estimated 80% of all criminal defendants, can
rely on for good representation is the attorney's personal ethics and zeal.
This is often, but certainly not always, enough.
Participatory defense seeks to redress this imbalance by empowering
defendants and their families to reach out to attorneys and become
actively involved in their loved ones' cases. They encourage families to
"seek a personal meeting with their attorney, something many families
41
don't know they can do." More broadly, trainings teach community
members about how the criminal system works, what to expect in court,
and connect newly charged people with others who have been through
the system. This information flow allows the accused and other families,
previously excluded from the "inside baseball" of the system, to better
direct their cases, and hold their attorneys accountable for quality
advocacy.
III. RISKS AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
In this Part, I recognize the reasons for hesitation by some defenders
to adopt participatory defense. These include both concern over risks the
39. The bar for ineffective assistance set by the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington is notoriously low, finding to be effective attorneys who slept or were
intoxicated during trials, or who failed to do the most rudimentary of investigations or
client counseling. See, e.g., David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright AND Strickland v.
Washington: BROKEN PROMISES, IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101 (Carol S. Steiker
ed., 2006) (arguing that Strickland essentially created a gross negligence standard given
its significant deference to trial counsel decision-making, refusal to incorporate ethical
practice guidelines, and focus on prejudice as a likely different outcome at trial). Indeed,
numerous commentators argue that this low bar significantly erodes the right to counsel,
particularly for indigent defendants. See id. at 102 ("If Gideon offers the promise of justice
winning out over poverty, Strickland breaks that promise, allowing the forces of inequality
to triumph as only the empty symbol of equality survives."). Malpractice is also an almost
unachievable bar. In most jurisdictions, to succeed in a malpractice claim in a criminal case,
a former client must show actual innocence or obtain exoneration of the criminal conviction
by appeal or post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.
1995) (stating this requirement even where defense attorney violated the ethical rules or
otherwise engaged in harmful misconduct).
40. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000) (estimating that 82% of

criminal defendants facing felony charges cannot afford to hire counsel).
41. Bornstein, supra note 18. As one defender pointed out to me, such a meeting is
something some attorneys think of as too time-consuming, and may "blow off."
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model presents, as well as territoriality and institutional inertia. I
conclude that the benefits of participatory defense outweigh the costs for
defenders, particularly since the ethics rules governing attorneys accord
with the movement's central principles. Indeed, this practice shift is
overdue because a holistic reading of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (the Rules) suggests a model like participatory defense is
ethically required.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given its focus on disrupting the static
representation model, public defenders initially were not uniformly
enthusiastic about participatory defense. As Jayadev explains, "At first,
[they] weren't sure what to make of us." 42 Some were (understandably)

concerned about adding to their already large workload and using up
scarce resources. Others feared that it was "merely a watchdog group,"
which would scrutinize or even criticize their conduct. 43 Many were
concerned, again, understandably, that the movement's tenets would
compromise effective defense. Indeed, at every new site, the organizers
continue to hear significant concern about risks. I will flag two here-the
risk that disclosing too much information about the accused can backfire,
and the risk that a client or his family will insist on strategies that will
ultimately undercut his defense. 44 Finally, a less visible but, I suspect,
still present reason for hesitation, is the resistance of public defenders'
offices, like any institution, to change and particularly to ceding control
to their clients.
A caveat is warranted; there is a huge range among public defenders,
even within the same office. Each attorney brings personal perspectives,
as well as prior experiences with clients or courts or community groups,
and some will have varying levels of comfort with incorporating new
people and elements into their practices. Some attorneys are more
connected-by race, background, or living circumstances-to their
clients. 45 Accordingly, even if the leadership of a particular office
42. This is not to minimize the potential problems with giving information to family
members, such as confidentiality or privilege breaches, as well as conflicts. Pennington,
supra note 11, at 611-12 (outlining some of these ethical pitfalls). None of these, however,
are fatal to implementing the model.
43. Geoff Burkhart, How to Improve Your Public Defense Office, 31 CRIM. JUST. 56, 57
(2016).
44. There are also other disclosure risks. For instance, attorney-client privilege does
not apply if third parties, including parents and other family members, are present during
conversations. Accordingly, a prosecutor could subpoena a parent to testify to these
conversations-something I think is ethically problematic, but permitted under the law.
My thanks to Bruce Green for this insight.
45. To this end, Lopez encouraged progressive lawyers to live in the neighborhoods
where their clients lived. See Gerald P. Lopez, The Rebellious Idea of Lawyering Against
Subordination 187, 194-95, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A
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endorses participatory defense, the organizers have to get buy-in from
individual attorneys for it to work. Some may never embrace it, but the
more widespread it becomes, the easier it becomes for new or even
experienced attorneys to accept it as the norm.
First, the risks. Humanizing clients can have unintended punitive
consequences. I have previously cautioned against an unquestioning
presentation of a client's traumatic history. 46 Probation interviews with
family members were one of the most difficult challenges I faced in
practice, as a client's parent or sibling might unwittingly provide
information about a young person's family history or substance abuse
that would lead probation and other professionals to find them in need of
47
more restrictive measures pending trial or after an adjudication.
Judges may find people in need of further incarceration for services, such
as attending school or job training, mental health, or even for their own
safety. 48 Presenting histories of trauma can also perpetuate negative
community stereotypes about family dysfunction and substance abuse
among groups disproportionately involved in the criminal law system, as
well as harm client autonomy and dignity. 49 These risks are not fatal; the
grass-roots structure of participatory defense may mitigate the last
concern, and certainly humanizing people in the system should at least
be considered in every case.
The second, and even more pressing, risk is that ceding more control
to the client, and his or her family and community, will force the defender
into strategies that might undercut the client's case. The participatory
defense organizers hear plenty of concern about this in each location

CRITICAL READER (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005) (describing one public interest lawyer who
lives in the neighborhood where she works, a predominantly low-income community of
color, which "appears to make all the difference in the world" to her lawyering).
46. Cynthia Godsoe, Balancing Client Dignity and Mitigation in Juvenile Defense
(draft on file with Author).
47. Or even deliberately-the scared straight approach still has surprising resonance
despite the clear evidence that placing a young person in the juvenile or criminal justice
systems does not end up helping them. See Bill Kilby, Why ScaringKids Out of Committing
Crimes Doesn't Work, VICE (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.vice.com/enus/arti cle/kwxxba/whyscaring-kids-out-of-committing-crimes-doesnt-work-1105 (citing studies reporting the
ineffectiveness and possibly crimogenic effects of these studies, while noting that "localities
and families around the nation continue to spend their own money terrifying young people
about crime in spite of the evidence that it may cause more harm than it prevents").
48. I have previously criticized this punitive paternalism in the context of prostituted
girls and young women. See Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, 52 HOus. L. REV.
1313 (2015).
49. Godsoe, supra note 46 (quoting one defender describing the difficulty in "portraying
our younger clients as victims of terrible upbringings while also respecting the dignity of
their lives and their loving families").
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where they work.5 0 There are two aspects to this. First, the client may
make unwise or self-defeating choices that the attorney will be bound to
follow. Second, the client's wishes may be subsumed by the needs of his
community or the movement. One example of this is the tension between
individual case outcomes, such as pleading guilty for various personal
and pragmatic reasons, and the movement's explicit focus on systemic
change, which may entail challenging the police and prosecution at trial,
potentially bringing a sentencing "trial penalty" to the defendant. These
are real risks that must be considered and taken into account. What
about the mother of a defendant who wants the probation officer or judge
to understand how hard she has struggled to escape abuse and drug
addiction, and the trauma her son has faced as a result?51 Or the teenager

who, encouraged by his community, wants to serve as an alibi witness for
his brother, although doing so will expose him to a perjury prosecution
and a violation of probation charge? 52
Another less legitimate reason for hesitation by defenders is
institutional resistance to change. Public defenders' offices, however
radical amongst the bar and liberal compared to prosecutors' offices, are
still bureaucratic institutions with the characteristic inertia and
particular reluctance to cede power.55 This is reflected in the tendency by
some offices to be willing to incorporate the movement only if it could be
shown to help their own practice-a version of "What's in it for me?" that
seems inconsistent with principles of client autonomy and choice that
underlie attorney ethics. 54 Inertia is a problem endemic to any large

50. See Jayadev Interview, supranote 7.
51. I have previously warned of the potential risks of revealing an accused's trauma;
while mitigating in one sense, judges and other authorities often view it as evidence of
greater risk and the need for more intrusive monitoring, treatment, or even incarceration.
See Godsoe, supra note 46.
52. Both of these examples are based on cases I had. There are many more iterations
of potential risks. To cite just one more example, what of the cousin, trying to help, who
interviews a prosecution witness, which the witness interprets as coercive, and gives the
prosecution an opening to argue witness tampering or intimidation. Thanks are due to
Jenny Roberts for this example.
53. In his seminal account of the modern state, sociologist Max Weber described the
bureaucratic organization as an "iron cage" confining people with its many rules and
hierarchical relations of obedience and stifling innovation. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM xviii (1905). Because "organizational members favor]

self-continuity and fe[el] threatened by change," theorists have subsequently described
bureaucracies as "poor at innovating or at embracing new ideas." ABYJAIN, USING THE LENS
OF MAX WEBER'S THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY TO EXAMINE E-GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 2
(2004).

54. Ewing, supra note 33, at 4 (quoting one county chief public defender that
acceptance can only come with showing defenders participatory defense is not just "another
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office; tellingly, the supervisor of my division of eighty plus lawyers used
to quote to us from "Who Moved My Cheese?," a business best-seller
about overcoming resistance to change.55
Coupled with institutional resistance is many individuals' desire to
hold on to privilege and hierarchy. Lawyers have advantages over even
sophisticated or affluent clients, by virtue of their profession and
education; the gap between defenders and their clients, who are
low-income, disproportionately of color, and frequently marginalized in
other ways, is vast. In his seminal critique of lawyers, Gerald Lopez
recognized that even public interest or "progressive" lawyers are
constrained by their privilege and the elitist norms of the profession that
cast them as "heroes" to their helpless and incapable clients.5 6 Lopez
urged lawyers to learn about the lived experiences of their clients, and to
recognize clients' and communities' value in achieving justice and social
change.57 His theory of rebellious lawyering has a lot of resonance with
the participatory defense movement, although, it is still somewhat
top-down, and driven by lawyers, as opposed to truly grass-roots from the
community of lay people.58
Criminal defense attorneys are certainly not immune to privilege;
indeed, the high stakes of these cases and disempowered position of their
clients may render them particularly susceptible to thinking they know
best and feeling like a "parent" to their clients.5 9 Some attorneys'
discussion of participatory defense suggests a hierarchical paradigm of
thing to do" but can help them better do their jobs). To be clear, this is an understandable
reaction in a world of scarce resources and extremely limited time.
55. SPENCER JOHNSON, WHO MOVED MY CHEESE? (1998). The book sold 28 million
copies worldwide and "became a publishing phenomenon and a workplace manual that
preached how flexibility in the face of changing times will reward people." Richard
Sandomir, Spencer Johnson, 'Who Moved My Cheese?'AuthorDies at 78, N.Y. TIMES (July
7, 2017).
56. Lopez, supra note 12, at 13-24. See also E. Tammy Kim, Lawyers as ResourceAllies
in Workers'Strugglesfor Social Change, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 213, 219 n.20 (2009) (building
on Lopez's work and advising that "the rebellious call to reject lawyer-client hierarchy and
to respect the cultural and communal factors that shape our lawyering remains important.
Social justice lawyers must be vigilant against the creep of privilege (whether based on
education, class, race, gender, sexuality, or language) and the temptation to dominate the
client.").
57.. Lopez, supra note 12, at 24-26.
58. See Jayadev, supra note 2 (not allowing attorneys into the initial participatory
defense meetings).
59. See Nicole Martorano Van Cleve, Reinterpreting the ZealousAdvocate, in LAWYERS
IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 301, 304 (Levin & Mather eds., 2012)
(quoting Chicago defense attorneys from an empirical study describing each other and
themselves as "egotistical[1y]" making decisions about a case rather than seeking real input
from a client, and as "fill[ing] a parental role" for "slow" clients).
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the attorney-client relationship with the attorney on top. For instance,
one bar leader specifies that the defendants, their families, and friends,
"recognize they are not lawyers, but want to take an active role in their
defense."60 It is unclear what would happen if people did not recognize
that they are not attorneys-would they challenge the attorney's
decisions on tactics, or their perceived authority and expertise? Similarly,
it is unclear why a watchdog organization, if participatory defense were
limited to that, should be so threatening. I think some of the hesitation,
and, again, I say this as a former defender myself, is best explained by
territoriality and a desire (even subconscious) to hold onto privilege.
Defenders, despite their underdog status representing individuals
against the massive power of the state, are still "insiders" in the vast and
complex criminal law bureaucracy.6 1
.

IV. SHAKING UP THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Despite the initial hesitation, however, defenders have increasingly
embraced the participatory defense movement. Some even proactively
reach out to the movement, which is something its founders "never
expected to happen." 62 The movement organizers addressed defenders'
concerns about time by showing how participatory defense could in fact
save time by harnessing family and community members into helpful
members of the team and making them more educated and efficient
consumers of attorney time and expertise. Also, the organizers were
called upon to allay attorney's fears about the risks of this practice over
and over, and they successfully did so by emphasizing that the risks of
families interfering and harming the case will always be there, and that
participatory defense in fact mitigates these risks by making families
better informed and more strategic about their interactions with the
criminal system players. Once these hurdles are overcome, and attorneys
see how the movement helps them and their clients, it is more and more
accepted. At the same time, it requires what Jayadev diplomatically

60. Burkhart, supra note 43, at 57 (emphasis added).
61. Jocelyn Simonson, What is Community Justice?: Mama's Bailout Day and Other
Bottom-Up Interventions in Everyday Justice, N+1 (July 10, 2017), https://nplusonemag.
com/online-only/online-only/what-is-community-justice/ (describing the system as "antidemocratic" in part because it "is run and maintained by privileged insiders: police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges"). See also Van Cleve, supra note 59, at 296
(describing the "central players who have an ability to affect case disposition" as a
"courtroom working group", which exists in every criminal court and includes prosecutors,
defense attorneys, judges, and bailiffs/court officers).
62. Jayadev Interview, supra note 7.
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terms a "reorientation" of public defense practice and the attorney-client
relationship more broadly. 63
I argue here that this reorientation is overdue. Defenders should
embrace the participatory defense model not only because it is effective
and beneficial to both their clients and themselves as advocates, but also
because it is consonant with the Rules, likely even ethically required.
Specifically, the movement's vision of empowered and assertive
defendants working with their counsel is consistent both with the spirit
of zealous advocacy and the mandate of client autonomy embodied in the
Rules, even if this ideal is not always translated into practice
on-the-ground. 64 As the American Bar Association (ABA) recently
declared, "[Its] policies governing the allocation of authority in [the]
attorney-client relationship .

.

. [derive from the] principle .

.

. that the

attorney is an assistant to the client."6 5 Put another way, the client is in
charge. The risks are real, but careful counseling and close adherence to
confidentiality and conflict rules can help to manage them, facilitating
effective defense along with community involvement and client
autonomy.66
63. The range of criminal cases is too vast and varied to argue that this model, and
particularly every strategy, is essential for every case. Nonetheless, I maintain that the
tenets of client engagement, autonomy, and dignity underlying the participatory defense
movement can effectively serve both clients and their attorneys in most cases.
64. The Rules are more useful for some practice contexts than others. See Leslie C.
Levin & Lynn Mather, supra note 6, at 3 ("While there are continuities across fields, we
also find that each practice area has its own particular norms and challenges, shaped not
only by substantive, procedural, and ethical legal rules, but also by clients, practice
organizations, economics, and culture."). Numerous scholars have called for more
specialized rules to address certain types of practice, often beginning with the criminal
field. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Should There Be a Specialized Ethics Code for Death-Penalty
Defense Lawyers, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527 (2016) (summarizing the arguments on both
sides and concluding that attorneys in certain areas need more specialized guidance,
whether via amended rules or other mechanisms). Despite scholars making such
arguments for over twenty-five years, policymakers are reluctant to impinge upon the (now
outdated) vision of a homogenous and unitary lawyering model. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins,
Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145,
1216 (1993) (persuasively arguing in the early 1990's that the "final death knell [had been
sounded] for the traditional model of legal ethics" and arguing for more specialized and
context-specific professional guidance). The only specialized Model Rules of Professional
Conduct is Rule 3.8, for prosecutors.
65. ABA Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 6.
66. An additional benefit to this model is the process-based advantages where people
feel fairly treated and engaged in a system. Community engagement thus can give
defenders' offices greater legitimacy within the communities they try to work with. C.f. Tom
R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000) (arguing
that the manner in which disputes are handled affect participants' evaluation of the court
system as well as perceptions of the fairness of outcomes).

732

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

A. Zeal
Zealously representing a client is a key attorney function, and nowhere
is this more important than in criminal defense where the odds are so
stacked against the mostly indigent defendants. Although much has been
made of the move of the word zeal from the text of the rules to the
comments, courts and scholars continue to emphasize its centrality to the
lawyering role. 67 Most significantly, ABA ethics opinions emphasize that,

although the wording of the obligation
a key component of the attorney's
supplanted 'zeal' with requirements
diligence (Rule 1.3), but the result [for

may have changed, zeal remains
role: "The Model Rules have
of competence (Rule 1.8) and
attorney loyalty and advocacy] is

the same."68

Zealous advocacy is particularly significant because it is connected to
client dignity and autonomy. As renowned ethicist Monroe H. Freedman
put it, zeal is the attorney's chief value, essential to the goal of enforcing
the "basic rights that recognize and protect the dignity of the individual
in a free society."69 Dignity comes not only through advocacy, but also
through the lawyer following the client's direction and empowering the
client. This last part too often gets lost in the public defense world of
overwhelming case volume, scant resources, and systemic inertia.
The participatory defense framework increases zeal and helps
defenders do a better job in part by humanizing clients to their attorneys,
as well as to other court players. Public interest lawyers can become
overwhelmed by the tragedies of their clients' lives, seeing only deficits,
rather than resilience, or losing sight of the individuals in the mass

67. See, e.g., Bacon v. Mandell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132231 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012)
(emphasizing that "a lawyer must ... act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf'). See also In re Agola, 484
F. App'x 594 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[A] lawyer has a duty to represent his or her client
'zealously."'); In re Welcome, 58 V.I. 604, 612-13 (V.I. 2013) (characterizing zeal and
competence, as per Rule 1.3, as "among the most important ethical duties owed by a
lawyer ... to [his client] and to the legal profession itself"). As to scholarship, see, e.g., Anita
Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165 (2006).
68. ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 367 (1992); see also
ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 411 (1998) (citing Rule 1.3 and
its comment for "[t]he duties of a lawyer to be a competent, diligent, and zealous advocate
for the interests of her clients.").
69. Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41
EMORY L.J. 467, 467 (1992). See also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 717, 760-61 (1987) (defining client autonomy to include the "exercise of [the] capacity
for choice").
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system of injustice. 70 One defense attorney describes how making a social
biography video for her client's sentencing also changed their
relationship:
Thinking through the story, the presentation, and the content we
wanted for the video was invigorating and enlightening. I learned
more about Jim, I gained respect and admiration for him. The people
we interviewed, the most important people in Jim's life, grew to know
us and respect us . . . . I learned a lot while making the video and
representing my client in a new, creative way let me see my job a little
bit differently too."
B. Client Autonomy
An even bigger challenge for defenders is truly living up to the vision
of an empowered client directing the representation. The difficulties in
communicating with many clients, who may be incarcerated or face other
barriers, coupled with the time and resource constraints of public defense
offices, are formidable challenges to adequately informing and counseling
clients to truly drive the case. 72 Moreover, allowing the accused and those
around them to make choices, particularly about strategy and means, can
implicate many of the risks flagged above. Yet, participatory defense,
more than the run-of-the-mill defense practice, most fully embodies the
attorney-client paradigm infusing the Rules. I discuss two Rules to
illustrate my point.
It may seem odd to begin with Rule 1.14,73 which governs the
representation of clients with diminished capacity. 74 This rule applies to
clients who have diminished capacity because they are minors or have a
disability.7 5 Let me be clear that I am not saying that all public defense
clients are of diminished capacity.7 6 Instead, I am using this Rule, which
applies to minors, the elderly, and those with disabilities or other factors
that render them not fully capable of directing representation, to

70. Godsoe, supra note 46 (discussing the seminal article by Lucie E. White,
Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990)).
71. South Carolina Attorney Reflects on Power of Making Social Biography Video!,
ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT (Jan. 29, 2015), https://acjusticeproject.org/2015/01/
30/south-carolina-attorney-reflects-on-power-of-making-social-biography-video.
72. See discussion, supranote 24.
73.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.14 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Some are, of course, if they are minors, or sufficiently developmentally delayed, or
mentally ill.
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illustrate the extremely thick notion of client agency underlying the
Rules. Rule 1.14 mandates that lawyers "shall, as far as reasonably
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship" with clients of
diminished capacity, continuing to take direction from them, even as to
bad decisions.7 7 Protective measures are only to be taken in extreme
cases. The Comments to the Rule emphasize the importance of client
decision-making and agency by referencing the fact that "children as
young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are
regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight" in custody
cases. 78 My experience representing children and young people reinforces
this insight; with proper interviewing and counseling, even very young
children can give clear opinions about their preferred outcomes and
issues of importance to them.
Accordingly, the Rule strongly discourages paternalism, long a
problem in criminal defense.79 It emphasizes the decision-making
abilities of even the very young or disabled, an ability that the lawyer
must work to empower and adapt: "[T]he normal client-lawyer
relationship [which also applies to those with diminished capacity] is
based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and
80
assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters." In
other words, it takes time and skill on the lawyer's part to explain the
court system and counsel clients of all types to help them reach decisions
in their cases. But this is what lawyers must do, no matter how difficult
it may be for clients who are frequently unavailable to meet, less
educated, or unfamiliar with the law.
Rule 1.2 applies more broadly to lawyers representing all types of
clients, and emphasizes the lawyer's obligation to follow the client's
direction.8 1 The Rule clearly puts the client in the driver's seat, beginning
with the mandate that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and .

.

. shall consult with the

client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." 82 Indeed, the
Rule drafters specifically declined to adopt language which would give
77. MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.14(a) (AM. BARASS'N 1983).
78. MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 1 (AM. BARAsS'N 1983).
79. See Van Cleve, supra note 59 (describing defense attorneys reporting they take a
"parental role" to advise their clients). For an early critique of attorney paternalism, see
Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer Doesn'tAlways Know Best-The Client's Wishes Must Not Be
Ignored Because of the Profession's Love Affair With Its Own Mysteries, 7 HUM. RGTS. 28
(1978).
80. Id. This entails a robust view of client counseling. See Godsoe, supranote 46, at 12
(quoting Abbe Smith).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR AsS'N 1983).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
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blanket authority to attorneys to "determine the means" without
mandating client consultation. 83 The Comments to Rule 1.2 elaborate
further on this relationship, wherein the client has "the ultimate
authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation," and note that lawyers usually defer to clients on such
means, with questions as to the costs of representation (not a possibility
in indigent defense) and concern for third parties who might be affected. 84
I am confident most lawyers abide by the first part of the Rule 1.2
mandate, at least as to major decisions such as whether to plead guilty.85
I am less confident, however, that all discuss other less obvious objectives
with their clients,88 and, particularly, strategize around the means. The
Comment to Rule 1.2 implicitly encourages this, and undercuts the client
direction and consultation mandated by the Rule itself, by reinforcing the
notion of attorney expertise over the views of the interested party:
"Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer
with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives,
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters."8 7 This

83. Brief for Ten Law School Professors and the Ethics Bureau at Yale, supra note 15,
at 14 (interpreting this history to mean that the Rule requires that "the lawyer's strategic
decisions must conform to the client's objectives").
84.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).

85. Although the on-the-ground reality of "'meet-'em-and-plead-'em' norms" in many
overworked and underfunded defender offices casts doubt on how meaningful and informed
a choice the client has in some circumstances. See Moore et al., supra note 17, at 1281.
86. One example is relationships with family and community that would be disrupted
by incarceration.
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983). Most courts
construing the respective boundaries of client and attorney decision-making have been
highly deferential to attorney expertise as to a wide swath of decisions deemed strategic.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1998) (stating that a lawyer usually has "full
authority to manage the conduct of the trial."). But see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 75859 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (opining that '"the assistance of counsel' carries with it
a right, personal to the defendant, to make [tactical decisions, such as which non-frivolous
issues to raise on appeal], against the advice of counsel if he chooses," and noting that "the
function of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and autonomy of
a person on trial by assisting him in making choices that are his to make, not to make
choices for him, although counsel may be better able to decide which tactics will be most
effective for the defendant"). Moreover, the ABA and other attorney professional
organizations have suggested that trial conduct is a more limited category. See, e.g.,
NACDL Amicus Brief, supranote 15, at 8, 10 (characterizing the attorney decision-making
realm as "plain-vanilla strategic decision[s]" and citing case law and practice standards to
conclude that attorneys "may not demand that the defendant follow what counsel perceives
as the desirable course because, ultimately, the defendant is entitled to make those
fundamental trial decisions that are so critical to his fate"); ABA Amicus Brief, supranote
15, at 15-16 (outlining such decisions including "how to craft and respond to motions, ...
whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike," etc.).
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language is unusual in the Rules for positing what clients do, rather than
what attorneys must or should do, and to what clients are entitled. It also
stops short of prescribing any means to resolve such disagreements thus
trying to provide much guidance to lawyers when disagreements over
means arise.88
A case currently before the Supreme Court of the United States
highlights the difficulties in drawing the line between client autonomy
8 9 a capital case, the
and attorney expertise. In McCoy v. Louisiana,
defendant's attorney admitted his client's guilt in court, despite the
client's stated desire to claim his innocence.9 0 Although this case seems
clearer than many, in that it involved a decision arguably carved out by
the Rule itself, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the attorney's
conduct as ethical, even required.91 Ethics experts and attorney
organizations including the ABA, however, have uniformly argued that
the attorney overstepped his authority and reiterated the principles of
client autonomy underlying attorney ethics, particularly in criminal
cases. 92 At oral argument, the justices reportedly suggested they will
agree with this latter interpretation. For instance, Justice Gorsuch
questioned whether we can even "call it assistance of counsel .

.

. when a

lawyer overrides [the client's] wishes." 93
The Rule itself signals that client autonomy is particularly important
in the high-stakes criminal defense context; the only specific example
included is that a defense lawyer must "abide by a client's decision"
whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, and testify or not.94 Yet, the

88. See also Van Cleve, supra note 59, at 296 (describing Rule 1.2 as providing only
"vague guidance" about decision-making). The Rules do permit an attorney to withdraw
from a case if her disagreement with a client is "fundamental," but this standard is very
high, particularly for court-appointed counsel such as public defenders. Accordingly, it does
not provide much of a remedy.
89. 138 S. Ct. 53 (2017).
90. State v. McCoy, 218 So.3d 535, 549 (La. 2016).
91. Id. at 569.
92. Brief for Ten Law School Professors and the Ethics Bureau at Yale, supranote 15,
at 12 (arguing, inter alia, that Rule 1.2 as well as the lawyer's role as a client's agent "reflect
an underlying commitment to placing the defendant front and center, in control of his
defense," while acknowledging that attorneys must and can make "forensic decisions" about
strategy during the trial). See also Brief for NACDL, supra note 15, at 12 ("Defense counsel
enjoy latitude regarding certain trial tactics. Such discretion, however, may not overcome
the fundamental rights of the accused."); Brief for ABA, supra note 15, at 7 ("The attorney,
as an assistant, is obliged to respect the client's autonomy to make fundamental decisions
about his or her case.").
93. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Skeptical of Lawyer's Conduct in Death
Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASs'N 1983).
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practice reality for most defense attorneys, the public defenders
representing indigent clients, likely render it more difficult for them to
meaningfully follow client direction outside of this iconic triad of choices.
Their immense caseloads, coupled with the presumption of being the sole
bearer of expertise in the legal system, can lead defenders to overlook the
value of an accused person and his community to defense strategy.
Indeed, ethics scholars have recognized how practice context may
greatly influence compliance with Rule 1.2. Ann Southworth describes
how public defenders with many, many clients "may struggle to reconcile
a duty to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation with the realities of a severely underfunded criminal
justice system in which many clients are impaired by addiction and/or
mental illness." She contrasts public defenders with lawyers working for
corporations who "hardly need to be reminded .

.

. to defer on aspects of

their interactions not squarely within lawyers' primary areas of
expertise." 95 In short, it is far easier for attorneys with paying clients and
ample resources to implement client autonomy.
An anti-paternalistic world view lies at the heart of the participatory
defense movement. The movement's core aim is to challenge the
dominant practice framework of a largely passive criminal defense client
outlined above. By explicitly not deferring to the professional elite,
challenging the status quo, and positing a novel view of expertise,
participatory defense directly takes on the means question that the Rules
leave ambiguous. Accordingly, disagreements over strategies and tactics
will not just sometimes arise in this context; rather, they are virtually
inevitable. Defenders who embrace this model-and I argue here that
they should-have to come up with a more coherent approach to disputes
over means and strategies than the Rules provide.
What could this look like? There are numerous possible scenarios, but
let us assume the dispute is not over an issue that the attorney knows is
a sure loser. Instead, it centers on a strategy about which the attorney
may know more in the aggregate, such as putting on certain witnesses or
arguing certain defenses, but about which a particular defendant may
96
have more insight into his own case and certainly cares more. This is a
tricky area for attorneys who must give clients an accurate sense of the
risks and benefits and advise clients against well-intentioned choices
that can harm their case.

95. See Ann Southworth, Our Fragmented Profession, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 431,
437 (2017).
96. See supra note 87 (outlining ABA and NACDL description of attorney sphere of
very technical strategic decisions, but noting that even these decisions can only be made
after consultation with the client).
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At the end of the day, however, I argue that these remain the client's
choices. The anti-paternalism principle embodied in the Rules outweighs
the typical deference clients may afford attorneys over means questions.
Counseling is essential to ensure that a client makes informed choices
with awareness of the risks. This sometimes entails very heavy-handed
counseling; an attorney should pull out all the stops when he believes
that a client's choices risk serious consequences, such as conviction or
incarceration, that may otherwise be avoidable. In my experience, and in
the much more robust experience of criminal defense clinical teachers
and supervisors, this almost always works.9 7 For instance, one long-time
public defender supervisor noted that careful client interviewing and
counseling have resulted in his staff of attorneys "getting the client on
board with whatever we are going to do. I can't think of an episode where
we have [not come to agreement over strategy]."9 8
Let us return to our two case examples. A mother who wants to tell
the judge or probation officer her story and the trauma her son has
experienced could be informed about the risks of this information
sharing, both for her and her son. It is important for the defender to also
remind the mother that, although she is an important and respected
member of the defense team, her son is the client, and it is ultimately up
to him to decide what information is shared. The attorney often will need
to meet with the family members separately to preserve client
confidentiality and ensure that the client is free of undue influence and
really comprehends the risks and benefits of various strategies. Finding
other ways for the mother to feel heard, for instance talking to the
defender and other members of his office, such as social workers, will also
go a long way towards alleviating the desire or need to "spill the beans."
In her conversations with authorities, such as the probation officer, the
mother can be encouraged to focus on the resilience that she and her son
have demonstrated to deter criminal system officials who sometimes
treat paternalistically defendants and families struggling with poverty,
addiction, and other similar issues.9 9 Finally, referrals to services that

97. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, "IAin't Taking No Plea:"The Challenges in CounselingYoung
People Facing Serious Time, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 26 (2007) (reporting also that she
"seldom worr[ies] about exerting too much pressure ... [and] worr[ies] instead about failing
to exert enough").
98. See Godsoe, supra note 46, at 12 (quoting a longtime public defender supervisor).
99. These families are disproportionately involved in the criminal system for a variety
of reasons, including the lack of a social safety net, but the facade of individual culpability
and choice continues to permeate prosecutorial, judicial, and other decision-making.
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can support her, her son, and the rest of their family are an essential part
of a holistic defense practice. 0 0
The second case of the teenager (the defender's client in another case),
who wants to serve as an untruthful witness for his brother, despite the
fact that doing so potentially exposes him to liability for perjury and a
probation violation, requires even more delicate handling. The client is
being pressured by his family to help his brother, and the youth also
wants to help out of loyalty. The attorney's job, however, is to best counsel
the client as to his own choices and to minimize risk to that client. Here,
that means meeting with the boy separately and using strong-arm
tactics-what criminal defense expert Abbe Smith describes as
"pestering and 'hocking,' bullying and manipulation," to convince him
10
that he should not perjure himself and take these risks. ' It is often
useful to bring in another attorney, particularly a more senior one, to give
the client this advice as well, in case the client feels that his own attorney
is exaggerating. The teen's attorney could also try to meet with the family
and community members pressuring the boy, as well as the brother's
attorney, to convince them of the seriousness of the consequences should
the teen testify falsely for his brother.
Although in these cases my colleagues and I were able in the end to
get to an agreement with clients and their families, there may be cases
where, even after counseling, the client still wants to pursue a different
path than the attorney. In such cases, the attorney must do his best to
help the client take those steps. Fortunately, this should rarely happen
when defenders are adequately trained and given sufficient time and
other resources to interview and counsel clients and their family and
community members.
V. CONCLUSION

Participatory defense is a promising new model to reduce
over-criminalization, both on an individual and systemic level. It also
enables overburdened defenders to satisfy their ethical mandates and
best fulfill the accused's right to counsel. Ceding control over strategy
and expertise is not always easy; in fact, it is counterintuitive to the way
many attorneys, perhaps particularly public defenders with crushing
caseloads and non-paying clients, generally operate.

100. Part of a defender's job is to find services that are not connected to the juvenile or
criminal law systems, ones that do not bring the same surveillance. This is an extremely
difficult task, but essential to keep defendants and their families out of the system as much
as possible.
101. Smith, supranote 97, at 24.
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Of course, many more things need to change to address the problems
with our criminal law system; we need bail reform, fewer arrests, services
instead of knee-jerk incarceration, to name just a few. Nonetheless, the
culture and strategy of public defense is very important to any systemic
reform.1 02 Participatory defense is doing some real work in this regard.
In the decade since its inception, organizers have already seen "massive
change" in the practice as defenders become more inclusive and "look
beyond the four corners of a case" to engage with the client and his family,
as well as with the community more broadly, for systemic change. 103
Overcoming power imbalances within the lawyer-client relationship
itself, as well as within the criminal law system itself, is essential to truly
transforming the structural inequities that perpetuate our racialized
criminal legal system.

As this Essay was going to press, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, with the majority holding that the
lawyer's admission of a defendant's guilt over the defendant's objection
was structural error necessitating a new trial. 104 Although I wish it had
gone even further in endorsing the human dignity of defendants, an issue
raised at oral argument, Justice Ginsburg's opinion does declare a robust
view of client autonomy, even the autonomy to make what may seem like
unreasonable or self-defeating choices: "Here. . . the violation of McCoy's
102. Other scholars have looked to defender culture and institutions as a means to broad
reforms, for instance Jenny Roberts powerfully argues that defenders should "crash the
system" by refusing to quickly plead out their clients. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1131
("[R]efusing to process individuals quickly through the lower criminal courts will impose
some of the real cost of mass misdemeanor processing on that system . . . [which] would
grind to a halt under its own weight."). Other scholars have argued that the right to counsel
(Gideon) has done little, and can do little, to accomplish systemic change. See, e.g., Paul D.
Butler, PoorPeople Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2178, 2195
(2013) (arguing that the most serious problem with the criminal system is that it targets
and punishes poor, usually of color, people, a dynamic the right to counsel does not address,
and in fact "bears some responsibility for legitimating . .. and diffusing political resistance
to" and noting that the real problem is not "about the right to a lawyer in a criminal
case . . . [but rather about] the kind of conduct that gets defined as crime, the racialized
exercise of police discretion, or why punishment is the state's central intervention for
African-American men"). These arguments are persuasive, but counsel can still make a
difference in individual cases, as Butler acknowledges. Moreover, on a systemic level,
defenders working within a participatory defense model can become part of a communal
effort which helps to erode the individualistic "diffus[ion] of solidarity" the American
rights-based discourse and system creates. Id. at 2196.
103. Jayadev Interview, supra note 7.
104. 584 U.S. _ (May 14, 2018)..
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protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel
to usurp control of an issue within McCoy's sole prerogative [i.e. the
admission of guilt]." Citing Rule 1.2, the opinion dismisses the dissenters'
argument that a client either cedes control to the expert, his attorney, or
can appear pro se-"the choice is not all or nothing. To gain assistance, a
defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel." This important
decision further strengthens the mission of participatory defense, and
should bolster efforts by public defenders to empower the defendants
they represent as people with their own agency, community, and voice.
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